South Korean press reports, citing official sources, have given a range of 1,km to 2,km for a TPY-2 configured in Forward-Based Mode, and a former director of the US Missile Defense Agency has said that its range is greater than 2,km. Thus, they argue, the radar will have no capability to look deeply into China and therefore should not be a concern to China.
However, the Terminal and Forward-Based radars are essentially identical, differing only in software and possibly some communications equipment. A radar can be converted from Terminal Mode to Forward-Based Mode, or vice versa, in only eight hours. Although China would almost certainly detect that such a switch had occurred, there would be nothing it could do to prevent it. But Chinese leaders know that intentions can change and that in the long run it is capabilities that matter.
First, the radar is clearly technically capable of observing ballistic missiles deep within Chinese territory. Chinese analysts have raised two related but distinct issues about such a capability. First, that the radar may be used to observe Chinese ballistic missile tests and, in particular, of countermeasures — steps to defeat a missile defense — used in those tests. Such information could help to defeat Chinese missile attacks in the event of a future conflict with the US.
Second, in the event of actual Chinese missile launches, the radar could directly observe the launches and relay information back to the US long-range national missile defense system.
The THAAD radar in South Korea would be sufficiently powerful to track the rocket stages of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from China toward targets in the western or central United States.
Such information could reduce the search requirements for the planned US Long-Range Discrimination Radar LRDR — scheduled to be operational in Alaska by — allowing it to focus on those points at which the Chinese missiles would be expected to come into view of the radar. Another possibility is that tracking data from the South Korean radar, together with the two Japanese radars, could be used to enable an earlier launch of interceptors or that these radars could be used to observe the deployment of decoys or other countermeasures.
The US now has seven Aegis ballistic missile defense ships — a number that will continue to grow as additional US ships are given ballistic missile defense capabilities — based in Yokosuka, Japan and equipped with SM-3 Block I interceptors. The U. In , the U. Future Capabilities. Future ballistic missile technologies require innovations in current missile defense capabilities and THAAD is being looked at to meet future challenges such as hypersonic boost glide vehicles.
The missile is 6. The launch weight is kg. A separation motor is installed at the interstage at the forward end of the booster section. The separation motor assists in the separation of the kinetic kill vehicle KKV and the spent boost motor. The shroud separates from the KV before impact. A gimbal-mounted infrared seeker module in the nose section provides terminal homing to close in on the target missile in the terminal phase of approach.
During the initial fly-out phase of flight, the seeker window is covered with a two-piece clamshell protection shroud. Metal bladders installed in the shroud are inflated to eject the protective shroud before the seeker initiates target acquisition.
The 12m-long by 3. While on the launcher, lead acid batteries provide the primary power. The batteries are recharged with a low-noise generator.
The ground-based radar units are C air transportable. The radar has the capability to acquire missile threats at ranges of up to 1,km.
Nevertheless, domestic opposition in South Korea has been strongest in Seongju County, where the system is deployed. North Korea sees the deployment of THAAD as an act of aggression and has accelerated its missile and nuclear programs with further tests. Production began in and the first contract with the U.
THAAD missiles are 6. They have a range of kilometers and can reach up to kilometers in altitude; this is higher than any other missile defense system. The radar, on the other hand, can identify missile threats up to 1, kilometers in range. THAAD missiles use kinetic energy, destroying an incoming missile through collision hit-to-kill. A typical THAAD battery consists of launch vehicles, two fire control centers, and a ground-based radar.
The launch vehicles are 12 meters in length and 3. There are two possible modes for the radar. The missile would be detected by the THAAD radar system when falling into range and the information would be relayed to the fire control center. The fire control center would then instruct the launch of an interceptor missile.
The target object data and predicted intercept point would be downloaded to the missile, and the missile would be fired from the launcher at the enemy projectile. The information on the target and interception would be continuously transmitted to the missile while in flight and the enemy projectile destroyed when it re-entered the atmosphere terminal phase. Each individual launcher takes 30 minutes to reload. According to official Lockheed Martin data, THAAD has maintained a percent mission success rate over its last 14 development and operational tests, which included for successful intercepts.
The U. One of the main characteristics of THAAD is the ease of transportation which makes it possible to quickly reposition the system. THAAD can also intercept a wider range of threats. It can intercept both exo- and endo-atmospheric threats, while the Aegis BMD can only intercept exo-atmospheric threats, and the Patriot-PAC-3 only endo-atmospheric threats.
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